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Despite the growing need for private sector participation (PSP) in the water sector, private sector 
investments in the water sector have experienced a downturn in recent years, especially concession 
projects, which accounted for nearly 80 percent of all PSP projects in urban water utilities from 1990 to 
2005. This paper traces the concession to its origin—the French model—and focuses on the challenges of 
transferring the model into the context of developing countries, by comparing two cases of concession 
projects in Jakarta and Manila. This comparative analysis suggests that although the French model 
appears a compelling choice because of its promise of attracting capital investments and improving 
efficiency, successful applications of the model may require substantial modifications to its original form 
in order to adapt to prevailing legal and social norms as well as to local governance capacity.  
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Private sector participation (PSP) in the water sector has experienced a downturn in recent years 
(Marin 2009; Araral 2009). According to the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) 
database, private investment in the water sector fell to US$29 billion between 2001 and 2010, after a peak 
of $58 billion during the previous decade. The rapid decline in the number of concession projects, which 
accounted for nearly 80 percent of all PSP projects in urban water utilities between 1990 and 2005, is 
arguably the single most critical factor contributing to the setback of PSP in water sector: the size of 
investments committed to concession projects has also declined sharply, from about $1.6 billion in 1995 
to only about US$127 million in 2009.  Much attention has shifted to water treatment plants, whereas 
private investment in water utilities has contracted threefold. Some high-profile cases of early 
terminations of PSP projects since 2000—in Puerto Rico in 2003; in El Alto and La Paz, Bolivia, in 2005; 
and in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 2006—have been worrisome, especially given that these projects had 
been in operation for a long period before termination, thus raising concerns about long-term 
sustainability of PSP projects in water sectors in developing countries. 
 The urgency of the water crises that led to privatizations during the 1990s remains unchanged to 
the present day: 37 percent of the world’s population lack improved sanitation facilities, and 780 million 
people still use unsafe sources of drinking water sources (UNICEF and World Health Organization 2012). 
In developing countries, the political difficulties of raising water tariffs, coupled with inefficiencies in 
government-owned water utilities, have trapped water systems in many cities within a vicious cycle of 
low tariffs and poor services. Because PSP will certainly continue to be among the few options available 
to municipalities in many developing countries for meeting the demands of rapidly growing urban 
populations, it is of paramount importance to understand where, when, and how PSP projects in the water 
sector can still be successfully implemented.  
The dominant models of PSP in the water sector have originated from developed countries such 
as France and the United Kingdom, and challenges inevitably arise in transferring these models into the 
variety of contexts encountered in developing countries, where operating environments may be very 
different. Legal and social norms as well as governance capacity vary from country to country, such that 
successful applications of existing models may demand substantial modifications to the forms commonly 
used in their countries of origin. Yet deviations from their original forms may distort the intrinsic logic 
and operating mechanism of these models, leading to failures to capture the expected benefits. The 
success and failure of PSP in the water sector thus may depend critically upon the nature and extent of 
modifications and alterations made while transferring existing models to new contexts. 
This paper focuses on difficulties in implementing concession projects in developing countries. In 
origin, concession projects can generally be traced to the “French model,” whereby private water utilities 
provide water supply and sanitation services to municipalities or similar areas under long-term concession 
contracts (Chéret 1994; Foster 2005). Discussion here focuses on the challenges encountered in 
transferring the French model into the context of developing countries, by comparing two cases of 
concession projects in Jakarta and Manila.    
Facing similar challenges, both Jakarta and Manila adopted the French model of concessions to 
dealing with water challenges in mid-1990s. But considerable differences emerged, not only in the ways 
in which the model was adapted to the cities’ different circumstances but also in the consequences of 
water privatization for both cities.  In the years since privatization came into effect in Jakarta in 1997, the 
price of water has risen to be among the highest in Asia (Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body 2009), 
yet water services remain poor: only about 43 percent of Jakarta has water connections, and households 
who do have connections have water only two-thirds of the time. Manila, in contrast, has seen a 
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significant  increase in coverage, reduction of non-revenue water (NRW) distribution, and improvement 
in water quality (Marin 2009; Wu and Malaluan 2008).    
Why have applications of the same model in these two cities resulted in such dramatically 
different outcomes?  Our comparative analysis suggests that while the case for adopting the French model 
might be equally compelling in either case, successful applications of the model may have hinged upon 
substantial deviations from its typical forms, tailored to suit formal institutions and informal structures 
(such as norms and social practices) on the ground. Specifically, our findings point to three leading 
factors in successful private sector participation in water utility concessions in developing countries: the 
importance of the design of concession contracts, the institutional capacity in water sector, and the 
involvement of consumers and the general public in improving the performance of concession contracts.   
The French Model: Origins, Potentials, and Pitfalls  
France is a global leader in PSP in the water sector.  Private companies provide more than 75 
percent of the country's population with water and about 40 percent with sewerage service (Haarmeyer et 
al. 1998). Three French conglomerates (Veolia, Suez, and SAUR) are dominant players on the world 
stage, capturing 70 percent of the international private water market.  
PSP in the water sector in France itself can be traced to the nineteenth century (Kraemer 1998). 
Because France has many small municipalities (about 36,000), it would be enormously expensive, as well 
as inefficient, for each one to run its own water utility (Clark and Mondello 1999; Hukka and Katko 
2003). Municipalities are also prohibited by law from selling their water and sanitation assets to private 
companies (Brown, Stern, and Tenenbaum 2006).  As a result, under traditional French concessions the 
state owns these assets, but the private operator manages and has full control over them until the end of 
the concession period (Guislain and Kerf 1995). This arrangement was thought to act as a constraint on 
the private sector, both in terms of ownership and in contractual terms.  Nevertheless, over the years such 
contracts have come to be modified so as to allow private operators to build and finance large 
infrastructure projects that can be transferred to the state at the end of the concession period. The 
concessionaire may be regulated by the public authority that awarded the concession and to a lesser extent 
by that authority’s supervising agencies. In the main, however, the contract is thought to be self-
regulating, known as “regulation by contract” (Groom, Halpern, and Ehrhardt 2006), on the assumption 
that the litany of service standards and obligations will regulate compliance. Any variation to the contract 
is a matter between the two parties, a matter for mutual negotiation.  
In contrast, under the “British model,” originating in the United Kingdom, regulators may be 
highly independent and have discretion to set tariffs and service standards. Their independence means that 
the regulators can make decisions without consulting the government and, furthermore, that these 
decisions cannot be overruled other than by a court (Brown, Stern, and Tenenbaum 2006). It is believed 
that discretionary regulation can play a role in curbing private sector opportunism and in representing 
consumer interests, whereas competition is contained by the bidding processes under which companies 
compete, both to win the initial contract and to have it renewed (Gómez-Ibáñez 2003). This mechanism 
can be described as “competition for market.” 
From this rudimentary historical perspective the French model offers two main advantages. First, 
self-regulation and technocratic excellence may take the “politics” out of policies, sometimes considered 
as a normative virtue for governments (Peters 1996). This “small government” structure is considered 
appealing as a matter of fiscal prudence.  The second advantage stems from economies of scale associated 
with large and highly competent private operators that are capable of providing high-quality service at a 
lower price.  
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The French model also has several shortcomings. In France the report of the Cour des Comptes, 
the official audit body, in 1997 cited a lack of competition, lack of transparency, corruption, water price 
rises, and unequal powers (Cour des Comptes 1997, cited by PSI 2000). In practice, the only real 
bargaining chip the municipality has is the threat of return to direct management (Hukka and Katko 
2003). 
The concession contracts scheme for managing the water sector has been increasingly adopted in 
recent years in many developing countries, particularly in large cities because of the large investments 
required to meet increasing demands due to urbanization, along with shortages in fiscal budgets. In this 
connection it should be noted that the primary form of the French model as applied in France itself is 
actually lease-affemage contracts, under which private water companies have a limited role in capital 
expenditure. Concession contracts as commonly implemented in developing countries are thus 
fundamentally different from those most widely employed in France, because these countries generally 
need to draw private investment to help fund infrastructure and services. It is ironic that although 
challenges in handling tariff increases in order to cover capital expenditure are often the root cause of 
failure for concession contracts in developing countries, the French model as applied in France can offer 
little by way of empirical experience to resolve the problem. 
Water Privatization in Jakarta 
Water supply services in Jakarta had suffered from poor service and high losses before 
privatization in the mid-1990s.  PAM Jaya, the government-owned water utility, could provide piped 
water connections to only 41 percent of its population (10 million), and non-revenue water (NRW) loss 
had risen to 57 percent (Lanti 2006).  Quality of service was also poor: about 30 percent of consumers 
with piped water connections received water less than 24 hours a day. During the 1990s the government 
decided engage PSP in its water/sanitation provisions in hopes of injecting significant investment into the 
sector at a point when PAM Jaya’s financial condition was not sufficiently viable to obtain large loans 
from the banking sector to finance expansion of services (Tutuko 2001). 
In 1997 the municipal government of Jakarta signed cooperation agreements with two consortia, 
one comprised of Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux and a local company, Garuda Dipta Semesta (GDS), and the 
other comprised of Thames Water Overseas Ltd. and a local company, Kekarpola Airindo (KATI), to 
operate Jakarta Raya waterworks and sewerage system for 25 years.  Under the cooperation agreements, 
the two private water companies were expected to invest a total of $318 million to expand the pipeline 
network over the first five years, serving 70 percent of the metropolitan population by adding 1.5 million 
customers to the piped water system. In addition, the proportion of unaccounted-for water was to be 
reduced from 50 percent in 1998 to 35 percent by 2002. 
No regulatory agency was established during the first three years after the private operators took 
over. On the basis of the operating principle of the French model, it was believed that the concession 
contracts themselves would be sufficient to govern the implementation of the agreements and that the two 
contracting parties—the government and the private operators—could rely on legal mechanisms to 
adjudicate in the instance of disagreements. From this standpoint no regulatory agency was deemed 
necessary (Figure 1). 
However, two crucial deviations from the norm of the French model came into play in Jakarta 
that may have undermined the efficacy of its application. First, the concession contracts were awarded 
without competitive bidding, leaving little chance for the government and consumers to reap any 
efficiency gains from “competition for the market,” a key premise of the French model. Although the lack 
of competitive bidding might not be surprising (the two foreign companies had partnerships with 
businesses closely tied to then President Suharto—Thames with Sigit Harjojudanto, Suharto’s eldest son; 
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and Suez with Salim Group, a close ally of Suharto— it may have been responsible for the highly 
lucrative return that these companies enjoyed from their investments: an internal rate of return (IRR) of 
22 percent for the duration of the contract.  
 
The second deviation from the standard French model was Jakarta’s introduction of a water 
charge as its tariff mechanism.  A water tariff is the price charged to consumers; a water charge is the unit 
cost (per cubic meter) of providing water determined by the need for full-cost recovery and the need for 
investment return (22% IRR), together representing the financial obligation of government to the 
concessionaires based on the concession agreements. It could be argued that the introduction of a water 
charge helps to de-politicize the rate-setting process and provides government with more flexibility in the 
timing of rate increases. But the use of a water charge also effectively shields private operators from any 
revenue risks due to difficulties and uncertainties surrounding tariff increases, because the government is 
responsible for any shortfalls in the case that water tariff falls below water charge.   
These deviations from the French model soon proved to be deadly. A month after the contracts 
were signed, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 began to unravel the Indonesian economy, and anti-
Suharto riots erupted nationwide. After Suharto stepped down, there was mounting pressure to cancel the 
contracts, but the Habibie government, concerned that a fight with two major multinationals would scare 
off future foreign investors, decided to renegotiate the concession contracts. When the cooperation 
contracts were renegotiated, the links with the two local companies were severed, and the two 
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reconstituted concessionaires were renamed Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ) and PAM Lyonnaise Jaya 
(PALYJA).   
Under the new contract, or so-called Restated Cooperation Agreement (RCA), targets for 
coverage and leakage reduction were significantly reduced; the financial crisis made the original targets 
highly unrealistic. Between 1998 and 2001, because of the crisis, the Provincial Government of DKI 
Jakarta had decided not to introduce any tariff increase, although the water charge, adjusted every 
semester in accordance with inflation, continued to rise (Lanti 2006). More importantly, the new contract 
set forth a radical departure from the French model: the Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body (JWSRB) 
was created in November 2001, four years after the initial contracts were signed (Figure 2). The 
establishment of JWSRB indicates that the self-regulation inherent in the “pure” French model was an 
insufficient safeguard for the implementation of concession contracts in a major city in a developing 
country.  
 
The establishment of this regulatory body, however, came too late to steer water privatization in 
Jakarta toward a more stable path.  Under its mandates, JWSRB can recommend new water rates, monitor 
the Jakarta waterworks, and mediate disputes between PAM Jaya and the contracting private companies. 
It also can recommend rate increases, but because final decisions on increases are in the discretion of the 
governor of Jakarta, a number of cases have arisen in which the governor ruled against JSWRB's 
recommendations due to concerns regarding the political costs involved. JWSRB’s effectiveness has also 
been constrained by its main role, which is to mediate disputes between the contracting parties, because 
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its function in such a capacity would be called upon only if there were disputes between the parties; it has 
rarely been called upon to perform such a role.  
JSWRB’s limited role in rate-setting is especially detrimental when contending with the gap 
between water charge and water tariff.  Water tariffs were first increased in April 2001 (35%), and 
subsequently in April 2003 (40%) and in January 2004 (30%). An automatic tariff adjustment (ATA) 
mechanism was introduced in 2005 to increase the tariff automatically each semester (Lanti 2006). As a 
result, revenue collected through the water tariff exceeded the water charge after 2003. However, when 
the ATA expired in 2007, the government decided not to renew it , and there has been no further increase. 
The gap between water charge and water tariff began to grow rapidly, because the water charge continues 
to increase. According to a JSWRB , PAM Jaya and the Jakarta local government would accumulate a 
staggering Rp 18.2 trillion in debt if the contracts were to continue unmodified until 2022. 
The predicament confronting the water system in Jakarta may not be surprising given the 
introduction of a water charge as a part of the tariff mechanism and incentive structure it has created. 
While much attention has been focused on the tariff change, as it is politically sensitive, the determination 
of the water charge has received much less scrutiny in comparison. Political leaders in Jakarta, the 
governor in particular, can score points politically by blocking initiatives for tariff increases, but a 
potentially countering force, the concessionaires, may not have any incentive to defend tariff increase 
initiatives, because their payment is calculated based on the water charge.  PAM Jaya is indeed sinking 
deeper into debt as a result of the growing gap between water charge and water tariff, but these debts are 
eventually borne by the Provincial Government of DKI Jakarta.  
In the years since water privatization, while Jakarta’s price of water has risen to be among the 
highest in Asia, water services have remained poor: only about 43 percent of the city has water 
connections, and households who do have connections only have water two-thirds of the time. In fact, 
according to a recent study by JWSRB, average annual consumer growth after privatization is lower than 
that before the privatization.  
 
 
Water Privatization in Manila 
In January 1997, in what was known as the world’s largest PSP deal, competitive bidding was 
held to privatize Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), a government corporation 
responsible for water supply and sewerage service to all Metro Manila. As with Jakarta, this decision was 
driven primarily by concerns over a water crisis, due mainly to the inefficiency of MWSS and its failure 
to expand coverage for a growing population (Dumol 2000). By 1997 MWSS had only been able to 
supply water to about two-thirds of the residents in its service areas and to provide sewerage connections 
to less than 10 percent of households.  Residents faced low water pressure and intermittent supply, an 
average of only 16 hours a day, and non-revenue water (NRW) stood at as high as 60 percent of total 
water distributed. MWSS had to rely on periodic government subsidies to service its debts (David 2000).  
The Water Crisis Act was passed in 1995, providing then-President Ramos a one-year emergency 
power to address the looming water crisis, as well as a legal basis for the privatization of MWSS. There 
was little suspense in choosing a concession to privatize MWSS after the French Embassy provided a 
million-dollar grant to conduct a technical feasibility study (Dumol, 2000) The service areas of MWSS  
were divided into two zones: the concession contract for the West Zone was awarded to Maynilad, a joint 
venture between Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux and Benpres Holdings Corporation (controlled by the Lopez 
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family) and Manila Water, a joint venture formed by United Utilities, Bechtel, and Ayala Corporation, 
won the concession contract for the East Zone. Both contracts were set to last 25 years, with ambitious 
targets in improving supply continuity, drinking water quality standards, wastewater treatment, and water 
and sewerage coverage. The winning bidders took over MWSS operations on 1 August 1997. The water 
tariff obtained through competitive bidding was extremely low. For Manila Water, in the East Zone, the 
initial tariff was merely one-fourth of that charged by MWSS before the privatization (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Summary of rate bids, privatization in Metro Manila 
MWSS Rate Per Cubic Meter, pre-Privatization PhP8.56 
 Percent Bids Peso Bids 
WEST ZONE 
Ayala–International Water 28.6333 PhP2.5140 
Benpres–Lyonnaise des Eaux 56.5922 4.9688 
Aboitix–Compagnie Générale des Eaux 56.8800 4.9941 
Metro Pacific–Anglian Water 66.8998 5.8738 
EAST ZONE 
Ayala–International Water 26.3886 2.3169 
Benpres–Lyonnaise des Eaux 62.8800 5.5209 
Aboitix–Compagnie Générale des Eaux 64.5080 5.6638 
Metro Pacific–Anglian Water 69.7888 6.1275 
Source: Dumol (2000) 
Unlike in Jakarta, in the Manila privatization a Regulatory Office (RO) was set up right at the 
start, as a part of concession agreements (Figure 3). It consists of a chief regulator and four deputy 
regulators, each responsible for one of the four functional departments —technical, financial, customer 
service, and administration and legal matters—and today has about 60 employees. Its role at first, 
however, was minimal: to implement the agreement on rates and to monitor information, reporting, and 
audit provisions. The types and mechanisms for tariff adjustments are well specified in the concession 




There is little doubt that the RO is far from independent. Because it was established as part of the 
concession agreements, it has no legal or statutory independent status (Fabella 2006). The government 
initially considered the option of setting up an independent regulatory agency by legislation, but it was 
anticipated that more than a year would be required to complete the legislative process and build the 
political compromises necessary for passing the legislation, a delay that could potentially undermine the 
entire privatization process (Wu and Malaluan 2008).  Instead, the contract provides that the Board of 
Trustees of MWSS, the asset owner and contracting party for the concession agreements, is to appoint the 
regulators, and RO’s decisions require approval from the board. The Appeals Panel, an arbitration body 
likewise created under the concession agreements to settle disputes that cannot be resolved through 
consultation and negotiation, also exercises regulatory functions of an appellate character.  
Despite the RO’s lack of independence, the benefits of having a regulatory mechanism in place 
can be seen from the very beginning.  In March 1998, less than a year after MWSS was privatized, Manila 
Water requested a rate increase of P 3.23 per cubic meter (an enormous amount, considering its bidding 
rate) under the Extraordinary Price Adjustment (EPA) clause in the concession agreement, based on an 
Appropriate Discount Rate (ADR) of 18 percent. The RO conceded that the 18 percent ADR in Manila 
Water’s application was substantially higher than the ADR implied in its original bid of 5.2 percent 
(based on RO's calculation), and it granted P 0.04 per cubic meter, or only 6 percent of the increase 
sought by Manila Water. The dispute over the ADR was due to an ambiguity in a clause in the contract 
with regard to the determination of ADR, and its interpretation. Although the Appeals Panel ruled in favor 
of the claim made by Manila Water that the ADR be determined by current market (RO held that it should 
instead be determined by the rate implied in the original bidding, according to a sentence in the contract), 
the incident demonstrated that despite its many limitations the RO was strongly committed to protecting 
the integrity of the concession contracts.  
The importance of including a regulatory mechanism when applying the French model was 
further illustrated in the RO’s dealings with a nonperforming concessionaire. According to the concession 
agreements, rate rebasing exercises would be conducted every five years to determine any water tariff 
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changes necessary for the concessionaires to recoup their costs and earn a faire return while meeting the 
targets of service expansions and quality improvements specified in the contract. In the first rate rebasing 
exercise, the RO recommended a tariff of P 17.00 per cubic meter for Manila Water, slightly lower than 
the P 19.54 per cubic meter requested, and P 26.75 for Maynilad, substantially lower than the P 34.72 per 
cubic meter requested; this substantial cut was interpreted as suggesting that Maynilad’s operations were 
grossly inefficient. Over acute contestations by Maynilad, this time the Appeals Panel ruled in favor of 
MWSS and upheld RO’s decision. Having lost money from the outset and having failed to pay concession 
fees to MWSS since 2001, Maynilad declared bankruptcy in 2004, and MWSS had no choice but to take 
back the operation (Wu and Malaluan 2008).  
Overall, the RO’s role in the first rate rebasing demonstrated how a well-designed regulatory 
mechanism is essential for concessions, as “regulation by contract” under the French model may not be 
sufficient. Notably, the modest disallowances imposed on Manila Water, the more efficient operator, 
indicated that the RO was able to exert pressure on private sector operators in a monopoly position, in 
order to improve efficiency. The strategy of dividing MWSS service areas into two zones, which had been 
introduced during the design phase of the privatization plan, likewise seems to have paid off, as 
benchmarking allowed the RO to defend its technical assessments more rigorously against various 
accusations made by Maynilad. The rate rebasing also provided financial incentives for concessionaires to 
make necessary investments. The significant rate increases awarded to Manila Water allowed the firm to 
improve its performance substantially in NRW reduction and service expansion. On March 18, 2005, 
Manila Water was listed on the Philippine Stock Exchange as the first IPO in the Philippines after the 
onset of the Asian financial crisis.  Since 2005 Manila Water has expanded its services to other cities in 
the Philippines, such as Laguna, Boracay, and Clark, as well as internationally.  
Positive progress was also made in the West Zone, where Maynilad had failed. In December 2006 
MWSS re-privatized Maynilad through a new round of competitive bidding, and a consortium including 
DMCI Holdings, Inc. (DMCI) and Metro Pacific Investments Corporation (MPIC) emerged as the new 
owners of the concession. The reconstituted Maynilad has made a profit since its first year in operation, , 
a feat it had not been achieved in seven years (1997–2004) under the ownership of Suez and Benpres, and 
NRW was reduced from 66% to 42% by the end of 2011. The turnaround of Maynilad implies that the 
regulatory mechanism established for water privatization in Manila has been able not only to evict an 
inefficient operator but also to provide the flexibility to furnish the affected concession with a more 
efficient replacement operator.  
The completion of the first rate rebasing exercise also fundamentally altered the regulatory roles 
of the RO, which had used the concession agreements as its primary regulatory mechanism in dealing 
with the concessionaires as well as with other key stakeholders. Although the expansion targets and other 
NRW reductions specified in the original contracts might still be enforced, the tariff adjustments 
necessary for achieving those targets would increasingly become subject to discretionary decisions by the 
RO, based on “efficiently and prudently” incurred expenditures and a “reasonable” rate of return for 
concessionaires. The new challenge for the RO became how to exert pressure upon concessionaires to 
continuously improve efficiency without reverting frequently to a competitive bidding process.  
The RO has responded to this challenge by introducing a system of key performance indicators 
(KPIs) and business efficiency measures (BEMs). These measures establish baselines that can be referred 
to in subsequent rate rebasing exercises and also will enable the agency to monitor concessionaires’ 
performance continuously so as to avoid politically costly showdowns during rate rebasing exercises. The 
concessionaires have embraced these changes wholeheartedly, because staying on track with KPIs and 
BEMs minimizes the possibility of major unwelcome surprises during rate rebasing exercises. Most 
important, any potential adjustments to KPIs and BEMs can be made through negotiations with the RO 
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informally and on an incremental basis, rather than in forced reconciliations of differences during 
politically charged rate rebasing exercises. In practice, the targets for KPIs and BEMs have been based 
primarily on proposals made by the concessionaires themselves and in that sense might be presumed 
“realistic and feasible.”  
By 2011, fifteen years after the privatization, water service coverage had increased from around 
60 percent in 1997 to 99 percent in the East Zone and 93 percent in the West Zone, especially impressive 
given that the population of Manila increased by 25 percent during the same period. Much of that 
expansion of services occurred in economically distressed areas, directly benefiting the urban poor, who 
had formerly relied on more expensive water supply alternatives.  Worker productivity in water system 
operations increased significantly after privatization. The number of staff per 1,000 connections dropped 
from 9.4 in 1996 to 1.3 for Manila Water and 2.2 for Maynilad in 2011. Both concessionaires managed to 
resolve over-employment from pre-privatization levels through early retirement programs, with little or 
no social disruption in the corporate setting. 
Comparative Analysis of the Two Cases 
 The case studies presented above show that the French model has fallen short in areas where the 
assumed conditions of its conventional form were not satisfied, in particular, in regard to competition 
through the tender process (Table 2). In the case of Jakarta, deviation from the conventions of the model 
proved to be costly. The lack of competitive bidding, in conjunction with a high level of corruption, led to 
concession contracts guaranteeing a hefty return (22%) for private operators at the expense of the city’s 
consumers as well as its government. As a result, the price of water in Jakarta is now among the highest in 
Asia, after Singapore and Hong Kong, and the Jakarta municipal government finds itself deep in debt. In 
comparison, the competitive bidding process adopted in Manila forced bidding consortia to lower profit 
targets in order to win contracts. Consumers and the city’s government were given a chance to reap the 
benefits of “competition for market” as intended in the French model.  
 
Table 2. A comparison of applications of the French model in Jakarta and Manila 
 Jakarta  Manila 
Deviations from the French Model No competitive bidding 
Separation of water tariffs  
      and water charges  
Regulatory mechanism 
Conformation to the French Model No regulatory mechanism Competitive bidding 
 
Contract incompleteness has been a common problem in applying the French model, even in its 
original milieux, due to uncertainty about the future and the long-term nature of concession contracts; the 
problem becomes especially pronounced when the model is transferred to developing countries. There are 
often significant information gaps about network conditions. In the case of Manila, for example, the 
concessionaires found, only after they took over the utilities, that the network was in much worse shape 
than expected. In addition, weakness in rule of law in developing countries may expose concession 
contracts to opportunistic behaviors by private operators and political leaders alike. One result is that 
adjustments to contracts may be inevitable but difficult to implement. Contract incompleteness is another 
factor that makes adequate regulatory mechanisms an essential ingredient in any sustainable concession 
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arrangements. In the case of Manila, the government’s establishment of the RO, a deviation from the 
“pure” French model, was a critical factor in dealing with contact incompleteness as well as with 
opportunistic behaviors. Although the RO’s discretionary power was initially quite limited, the agency 
was not without teeth, as can be seen in its success in the dispute over ADR and in the first rate rebasing 
exercise. More importantly, the RO has gradually become transformed into a credible regulatory authority 
with increased capacity and with its development of new regulatory instruments such as KPIs and BEMs. 
In comparison, the need for a regulatory mechanism was largely overlooked in Jakarta’s concession 
contracts, as it was believed that “regulation by contract” was sufficient—in fact, there was no regulatory 
agency in the first four years after the private operators took over. When JWSRB was eventually set up in 
2001, the effort proved to be too little and too late, and JWSRB was never given a chance to function as 
regulatory authority.  
Public resistance to tariff increases has often been a contentious issue responsible for the failure 
of water concessions in many developing countries. In the case of Jakarta, the strategy adopted to avoid 
this source of tension was the introduction of water charge, a deviation from the French model, to 
eliminate revenue risks for concessionaires. This deviation from the conventional model might in fact 
have helped to reduce tensions over the determination of the water tariff, but it merely postponed the 
problem by allowing a widening gap between water charge and water tariff to reach crisis proportions. 
More importantly, although the water charge is determined by the efficiency level and appropriate return, 
it has largely escaped scrutiny while much attention has been fixed on the water tariff. As a result, there is 
a lack of pressure for private operators to increase efficiency.    
Concluding Remarks 
The advantage of the French model has been increasingly challenged even in France, the 
heartland of private water concessions. In 2001, a corruption scandal in Grenoble led to re-
municipalization of the water supply, and since then several municipalities, including Paris, have 
followed suit either by canceling concession contracts or not renewing them.  A major criticism of the 
private water concessions is their poor value for the amount of money invested, as their water tariffs are 
higher than rates in publicly owned water utilities (Chong et al. 2006; Lobina and Hall 2007).  
The comparative analysis presented here, of applications of French model in Jakarta and Manila, 
reveals a fundamental deficiency of the model: inadequate attention to need for regulation. On the 
premise of the “pure” French model, concession contracts themselves would be sufficient to govern the 
implementation of agreed-upon rates, services, and procedures, and no regulatory agency is deemed 
necessary. Yet it is unrealistic to expect that such contracts can be made to specify all possible 
contingencies, given changing circumstances over time. The problem of inattention to regulatory 
provisions in concession contracts is especially acute in developing countries, where the most appealing 
feature of concessions is that they attract private investments. Manila’s establishment of the Regulatory 
Office, a deviation from the “pure” French model, was a critical factor in its success with municipal water 
concession contracts, and Jakarta’s neglect in installing a regulatory mechanism proved to be a costly 
shortcoming.  
But not all deviations from the conventional French model are equally favorable. “Competition 
for market,” whereby companies compete with one another, both to win the initial contract and to have it 
renewed, is essential for the success of concessions.  Jakarta introduced a major deviation from the model 
by awarding concession contracts without competitive bidding, even though, in the model, the bidding 
process is intended to reap the benefits of competition among different bidders. In France, where the 
model originated, the potential for genuine competition might be limited because of high market share 
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accruing to the three main French conglomerates (Veolia, Suez, SAUR) that participate in concessions for 
large infrastructure projects.   
 The findings from this competitive analysis of the applications of the French model in Jakarta 
and Manila have yielded several important policy implications. First, concessions will continue to be the 
primary form of private sector participation (PSP) in the water sector in developing countries, due to 
needs for capital investments and for improvements in efficiency. Our analysis points to the importance of 
appropriate institutional arrangements if such projects are to succeed. Second, many outstanding 
concession contracts are currently in operation, some of which are experiencing difficulties of one kind or 
another. Perhaps our analysis will shed light on potential improvements that could make these 
concessions sustainable. Third, the lessons from applications of the French model in developing countries 
may shed light on some inherent problems in the model itself and in turn inform applications in developed 




Araral, Eduardo. 2009. “The Failure of Water Utilities Privatization: Synthesis of Evidence, Analysis and 
Implications.” Policy and Society 27 (3): 221–228. 
Brown, Ashley C., Jon Stern, and Bernard William Tenenbaum. 2006. Handbook for Evaluating 




Chéret, Ivan. 1994. “Managing Water: The French Model.” Valuing the Environment. The World Bank. 
Washington, DC. 
Chong, Eshien, Freddy Huet, Stéphane Saussier, and Faye Steiner. 2006. “Public-private Partnerships and 
Prices: Evidence from Water Distribution in France.” Review of Industrial Organization 29 (1-2): 149–
169. 
Clark, Ephraim, and Gerard Mondello. 1999. “Insitutional Constraints in Water Management: The French 
Case.” Water International 24 (3): 266–268. 
David, C. 2000. “MWSS Privatization: Implications on the Price of Water, the Poor, and the 
Environment.” Philippine Institute for Development Studies: Makati City, Philippines. Available on Line 
at Http://dirp4. Pids. Gov. Ph/ris/pdf/pidsdps0014. Pdf. 
Dumol, M. 2000. The Manila Water Concession: A Key Government Official’s Diary of the World’s 
Largest Water Privatization. World Bank Publications. 
Fabella, R. 2006. “Shifting the Boundary of the State: The Privatization and Regulation of Water Service 
in Metropolitan Manila.” Centre on Regulation and Competition (CRC) Working Papers. 
Foster, Vivien. 2005. Ten Years of Water Service Reform in Latin America: Toward an Anglo-French 
Model. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLACREGTOPWATSUPSAN/FeaturedTopics/20832025/WSSSer
viceReform.pdf. 




Groom, E., J. Halpern, and D. Ehrhardt. 2006. “Explanatory Notes on Key Topics in the Regulation of 
Water and Sanitation Services.” Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Board Discussion Paper 6. 
Guislain, Pierre, and Michel Kerf. 1995. “Concessions–The Way to Privatize Infrastructure Sector 
Monopolies.” Public Policy for the PRIVATE Sector. 
http://cdi.mecon.gov.ar/biblio/docelec/bm/ppps/N59.pdf. 
Haarmeyer, D., A. Mody, Office of the Vice President, R. Mobilization, and World Bank. 1998. Tapping 
the Private Sector: Approaches to Managing Risk in Water and Sanitation. Project Finance and 
Guarantees Dept., Resource Mobilization and Cofinancing Vice Presidency, World Bank. 
16 
 
Hukka, Jarmo J., and Tapio S. Katko. 2003. “Refuting the Paradigm of Water Services Privatisation.” In 
Natural Resources Forum, 27:142–155. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1477-
8947.00049/abstract. 
Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body. 2009. “The First Ten Years of Implementation of Jakarta Water 
Supply 25-Year Concession Agreement (1998-2008).” 
Kraemer, R. Andreas. 1998. “Public and Private Water Management in Europe.” Water Resources 
Management in Europe 1. 
Lanti, Achmad. 2006. “A Regulatory Approach to the Jakarta Water Supply Concession Contracts.” 
Water Resources Development 22 (2): 255–276. 
Lobina, Emanuele, and David Hall. 2007. “Experience with Private Sector Participation in Grenoble, 
France, and Lessons on Strengthening Public Water Operations.” Utilities Policy 15 (2): 93–109. 
Marin, P. 2009. Public-private Partnerships for Urban Water Utilities: A Review of Experiences in 
Developing Countries. World Bank Publications. 
Peters, B. Guy. 1996. The Future of Governing: Four Emerging Models. University Press of Kansas 
Lawrence. http://www.getcited.org/pub/100127054. 
Tutuko, Kris. 2001. “Jakarta Water Supply.” In Sustainable Urban Services, Hong Kong Seminar, Hong 
Kong, Pam Jaya. 
UNICEF and World Health Organization. 2012. “Progress on Drinking Water and Sanitation, 2012 
Update.” 
Wu, X., and N. A Malaluan. 2008. “A Tale of Two Concessionaires: A Natural Experiment of Water 
Privatisation in Metro Manila.” Urban Studies 45 (1): 207. 
 
